Crucial intelligence leak calls U.S. trustworthiness into question: F.B.I. agents arrested Jack Teixeira on Friday on espionage charges after the leak was traced back to the 21-year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard. There may yet be more arrests, as Teixeira appears to have been posting the documents on a private Discord server from which another individual or individuals spread them more widely.
The good news for the United States is that no evidence has surfaced so far that an enemy nation had managed to infiltrate American intelligence networks; the bad news is that it turned out they didn’t need to.
What we are watching: Will allies restrict information sharing with Washington?
The situation is an odd one. There have been major intelligence leaks in the past — and startlingly penetrative infiltrations of the U.S. government — but any spy agency worth its salt spends considerable resources on counterintelligence. When there are breaches, allies can be reassured with detailed explanations of how a given problem will be prevented in the future.
The thing is, Teixeira does not appear to have been working for any foreign power, or even to have found ideological justification or financial compensation for his leaks. A look at the publicly available evidence paints a picture of an insecure young man trying to impress online acquaintances by portraying himself as a powerful figure with access to secret documents. Teixeira is a low-ranking guardsman who works in tech support.
The question being asked in allied capitals worldwide is how Teixeira got his hands on top-secret documents, and Washington doesn’t have great answers. In fact, the leviathan scope and size of America’s intelligence apparatus appears to be a major part of the problem.
That puts allies in a very difficult position. Put yourself in the shoes of, say, South Korea’s intelligence chief. Sharing military information painstakingly gathered from North Korea with the United States could play a vital role in deterring Pyongyang and even save many lives in the event of an attack. But if that information is leaked because the United States cannot properly contain it in trusted compartmentalizations, it may ultimately put those same lives at risk. It could also allow Pyongyang to identify Seoul’s intelligence sources, and harden itself against similar methods of infiltration, wasting all the time, money and lives spent on the effort. How would you be thinking about future intelligence sharing with the United States in that event?
And that’s not even to mention the revelations of extensive U.S. surveillance of allied countries, including South Korea — though after the Snowden leaks in 2013 everyone likely suspected as much. We’re keeping a careful eye on how allies react to U.S. messaging on the issue.
Assad’s rehabilitation roadblocks: Saudi Arabia welcomed Syria’s foreign minister in a surprise visit to Riyadh this week as the two countries accelerate their normalization of ties. Saudi Arabia’s warming relations with Iran have made bringing Syria back into the diplomatic fold an attractive objective, but not all Arab countries are thrilled. At least five states are opposed to Syria’s re-entry into the Arab League, and even Egypt — a close Saudi ally — expressed its reservations.
What we are watching: Can the Arab League force Damascus to engage with the opposition?
Syrian President Bashar Assad’s brutal crackdown on protesters during the Arab Spring resulted in both the country’s expulsion from the Arab League and the brutal civil war, which devastated a generation of Syrians. Throughout the long ordeal, Assad has shown no appetite for compromise, preferring to bomb his own people, asphyxiate children with chemicals and invite in brutal Russian mercenaries, rather than share power.
But now the objecting states are demanding that he engage with the opposition and give ordinary Syrians a greater voice in their own government. They have little power on paper — the Arab League’s ability to enforce agreements is very limited — but rejoining the body is a first step toward a more global political rehabilitation. We’ll be keeping an eye on whether carrots might be more effective than sticks on Assad in this matter, and whether any outreach to the opposition results in a credible power-sharing scheme.
Lula visits China: Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visited China this week as he sought to deepen ties with his largest trade partner and restore relations somewhat damaged — rhetorically, if not very much in practical terms — by his predecessor. Before meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Lula questioned why all international trade must be conducted using U.S. dollars and wondered aloud why countries cannot use their own currencies.
What we are watching: Will Lula’s notions of non-dollar denominated trade find an interested audience beyond China?
I’ll leave the academic explanations of the advantages of a single global reserve currency to your favorite economist, but suffice it to say having one currency to do business with anywhere is pretty handy. That is, unless you find yourself in a situation like Argentina or Pakistan, where a shortage of dollars can stress a society to the core.
Neither Beijing nor Brasilia are likely to find themselves in such severe circumstances, but there are political and strategic considerations as well. China would very much like to insulate its economy from potential U.S. sanctions as tensions continue to mount, and being able to use its own renminbi to trade would go a long way toward that goal. Brazil is not as concerned about U.S. sanctions, but like all middle powers, having more options and flexibility gives it greater leverage in its relations with the great powers. In other words, a Brazil that can trade in both dollars and yuan might find itself at an advantage as Sino-American disentanglement continues. We’ll keep an eye on whether Lula is serious about setting up alternative trade paradigms, and how Washington reacts.
