Japan will host the G-7 summit in Hiroshima: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been on a serious diplomatic blitz since the beginning of the year, laying the groundwork for the meeting in Hiroshima next weekend. Kishida visited Ukraine, multiple other countries in Europe, the United States, Canada, South Korea, and India to solidify ties and demonstrate that Japan is dedicated to preserving the liberal international order and countering China. And after the G-7, Kishida is planning a tour through several African countries where China has had considerable success building political and economic influence.
I’ll have more on Kishida and his remarkable recovery in the public eye for you a little closer to the summit, but today we’ll have a look at the broader agenda.
What we are watching: Can the world’s leading democracies present a united front against both China and Russia?
The latter seems eminently achievable. Ministers from G-7 countries have been organizing methods to tighten sanctions on Russia and hold Russian President Vladimir Putin accountable for war crimes for months. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to video conference into the summit as well.
There are a few potential flies in the ointment, however. For starters, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil is not a G-7 member, but was invited to attend) plans to present his vision to bring together fellow guest attendees India and Indonesia to act as mediators in Ukraine. It’s an idea that might come from the right place, but it conflicts with the message from G-7 leaders of full support for Ukraine until Kyiv decides it is in its own interest to talk peace. That said, as I wrote this week, public opinion in Brazil about the war in Ukraine strongly reflects that in countries that more ardently support Kyiv, which likely limits how far Lula can take his rhetoric and policy.
Speaking of peace, China announced it would dispatch a special envoy to advance its efforts to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. While it is not clear that Beijing is serious about the effort, or the degree to which Kyiv trusts its good offices, there’s a possibility it could open up some leverage. European leaders are generally more hesitant about confronting China than Washington would prefer (see their disciplined use of the term “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” their economies from China), and we will be interested to see how they react to Beijing’s mediation, whatever that might look like.
Despite talking about peace in Europe, Beijing is demonstrating considerable bellicosity in Asia around the summit. A Chinese naval flotilla is conducting a circumnavigation of Japan’s main islands just ahead of the summit, a provocative action, though not one that crosses any legal boundaries. Still, I wonder if the show of force might backfire. It allows Kishida to portray Beijing to European leaders as aggressive and prone to disproportionate reactions. We’ll be interested to see how European leaders describe the discussions.
One last thing I’d be remiss to pass over: Biden has suggested he might skip the conference if the debt ceiling negotiations are still in a bad place. I will be interested to see what other leaders have to say about a potential looming U.S. default should Biden skip the summit.
Khan detention escalates Pakistan’s drama: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s detention on charges he calls politically motivated this week set off a deadly wave of violence across Pakistan. The Supreme Court called the detention unlawful, and Khan was able to secure a two-week bail, but not before the army deployed into the streets to quell unrest. Authorities say they have arrested at least 2,500 people.
What we are watching: How long will Khan remain a free man?
Khan himself isn’t optimistic: speaking to reporters after his release he said “I am 100% sure I will be arrested again.” He also accused army chief Gen. Syed Asim Munir of orchestrating his arrest and the current government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of colluding with senior military leadership to remove him from office last year.
The government is stepping up pressure on Khan ahead of elections that are constitutionally mandated to be held in a few months. The Supreme Court has sided with Khan previously, and its intervention on his behalf during his detainment may incentivize the government to find ways around its authority.
It is important to remember that no democratically elected Pakistani prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term in office. The military has attempted multiple coups and wields considerable power even over civilian governments. Khan’s popularity has afforded him some protection, but the assassination attempt late last year and this week’s arrest demonstrate that he is far from untouchable.
The question we’ll be watching all summer is: can he find a way to make it to election day a free man? And what does the military do in response to his likely victory at the polls?
A China reset? U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan spoke with senior Chinese foreign policy adviser Wang Yi in a previously unannounced meeting in Vienna to convey Washington’s willingness to try to de-escalate tensions.
Sullivan says he told Wang that Washington is looking to move on from the spy balloon incident, and readout from both sides were positive about the meeting.
What we are watching: Is the relationship too systemically fractured to heal?
As mentioned above, Beijing’s bellicose actions are hard to ignore. The Biden administration has leveraged fear of them to make great strides in security arrangements with Asian allies such as South Korea and the Philippines specifically to address that bellicosity, not to mention its efforts on China-Europe trade ties.
Extended tensions and poor communication between China and the United States is risky, however, and taking down the temperature serves everyone’s interests. Sullivan communicated relatively modest goals of putting high-level communications back on track and U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns said earlier in May that the United States seeks detente with Beijing.
That said, the mood among China scholars and policy wonks here in D.C. is not optimistic about rapprochement, and domestic political considerations may put limits on reversing hawkish policy. For example, Yukon Huang and Genevieve Slosberg at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggest that hawkish trade policies toward China don’t make much sense, but are likely to continue because of the intense pressure on U.S. politicians to appear tough on Beijing. We’ll be watching for signs that that paradigm might change.
